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Background
The research that informs this study was conducted in Chapra village, Kushtia District, 
Bangladesh, located about 20 km east of the Indian border. Chapra is located within the 
Ganges Dependent Area (GDA) in Bangladesh which, in turn, is located within the Gan-
ges–Brahmaputra Basin (GBB), one of the largest river basins in the world by area and 
second only to the Amazon in terms of the total volume of water it carries (see Fig. 1). 
The livelihood challenges faced by farming communities in Chapra are typical of those 
that occur throughout the GDA in Bangladesh and in some respects are representative 
of those that occur throughout the entire basin. Water governance structures in all the 
basin countries tend to be highly centralized and this is particularly the case in Bangla-
desh. Chapra is just one of many communities that has experienced a significant reduc-
tion in water availability due to upstream diversions from the Ganges River by India but 
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they have also been harmed by actions taken by their own government, typically with 
the support of international donor organizations. Why would the Bangladesh govern-
ment and a host of well-intentioned international donors take actions that would harm 
rather than benefit rural communities throughout the GDA? Many factors combine to 
create the negative outcomes we document in this paper, but foremost among them, we 
believe, is the almost total exclusion of local knowledge and local people within water 
governance institutions.
We begin our analysis with a brief description of the physical characteristics of the 
Ganges–Brahmaputra Basin and the types of ecological resources and services it gener-
ates as common property in communities like Chapra. We then describe the ways in 
which regional and national hydro-political agendas drive governance processes without 
due regard for human rights, equity or sustainability. We then present evidence from 
Chapra to support our argument that hydro-politics and top-down government pro-
cesses are harming rather than assisting local communities to sustain and/or develop 
livelihood capacities. We conclude with a discussion of governance principles and pro-
posals for institutional reform based on problems identified at Chapra but known to 
exist throughout the GDA.
The Ganges–Brahmaputra Basin
The Ganges–Brahmaputra Basin (GBB) originates in the Himalayan Mountains, flows 
through China, Nepal, Bhutan, India, and Bangladesh, and ends in the Bay of Bengal 
(Fig. 1). Three percent of the basin lies in China, 14 % in Nepal, 79 % in India, and 4 % 
in Bangladesh (Ahmad and Ahmed 2003: 307). The Ganges River length is 2600 km, the 
world’s thirteenth longest river, with a coverage area of 1,080,000 km2 (Rahman 2009: 
3). The two major originating branches of the Ganges are the Alakananda and Bhagirthi 
rivers that flow southward and meet in Garhwal district of Uttarkhand province in India. 
Some tributaries of the Ganges originate in China like the Karnali, the Gandak, and the 
Fig. 1 The Ganges–Brahmaputra Basin in China, Nepal, Bhutan, India, and Bangladesh. Source: Wikimedia 
(2015)
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Kosi, some in Nepal like the Rama Ganga, the Sarda, the Karnali-Rapti, and the Gandak-
Kosi, and others in India like the Yamuna and Gomati. All connect with the Brahmapu-
tra River in Bangladesh (Parua 2010: 267–8).
The Brahmaputra River originates on the northern slope of the Himalayas in the 
Kailash range in China and flows eastward as the Tsangpo River about 900 miles. It 
then turns southward entering the Indian frontier at Sadiya, Assam State, as the Siang 
or Dihang River. The total drainage area of the river within India occupies 97  % of 
Arunachal Pradesh, 90 % of Assam, 50 % of Meghalaya, 65 % of Nagaland, 100 % of Sik-
kim, and 15 % of West Bengal (Sarma 2005: 452). As with the Ganges River, the com-
bined drainage of the Brahmaputra flows through Bangladesh before it reaches the sea in 
the Bay of Bengal.
The GBB functions as a single ecological unit throughout its entire range and in this 
paper we emphasize the fact that it is a social as well as ecological system, a waterscape 
in Baviskar’s (2007) terminology and a total social fact according to the approaches of 
Orlove and Caton (2010: 402) and Wagner (2013: 2). In the Ganges Basin, where this 
study is situated, two characteristics, high altitude headwaters and flat terrain valleys, 
provide major ecological resource abundances for cropland soil fertility, domestic ani-
mal rearing and wild fish habitats (Ahmad and Ahmed 2003:3). The Ganges Dependent 
Area (GDA) in Bangladesh (see Fig. 2) was particularly rich in these resources prior to 
the massive interventions by the States of India and Bangladesh over the past half cen-
tury. The Gorai River, a branch of the Ganges River in Bangladesh is the major founda-
tion for the regional ecosystems we describe in this paper, in Kushtia District, but also 
for many other ecosystems including the Sundarbans.
Chapra
Kushtia District has a population of 1.8 million people with an average density of 1073 
people per square kilometer (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) 2011). Ninety-six per 
cent of the people are Muslim and four per cent are Hindus and other religious believ-
ers. Chapra village, the source of this paper’s fieldwork data, is located along the Gorai 
River 7 km south of where the Gorai branches off from the Ganges. It is composed of 
six sub-villages with a total population of 4331 people, making it the largest of several 
villages under the jurisdiction of the Chapra Union Council, which in turn falls within 
the Kumarkhali Upazila Parishad (Sub-district). Seventy-six per cent of the population 
of Chapra and 963 of 1387 households make their livings in the agricultural sector and 
40 % of this population are females. Another 12 per cent of the local population make 
their livings as day labourers in various employment sectors including agriculture (Bang-
ladesh Election Commission 2011).
The agricultural sector in Chapra and throughout Kushtia District is marked by 
extreme inequality. Wealthy farmers make up 1 % of the farming population in the Dis-
trict; intermediate farmers make up 8 %; small farmers 51 % and marginalized farmers 
41 % (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2005). Fourteen percent of the marginalized farm-
ers own no farm land at all but depend on farm labour for all or most of their income. 
We use the term “wealthy” to refer to households classified as “large” by the Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics (BBS) (2005). Large households are those who own 7.50 acres or 
more agricultural land. BBS classifies those owning from 2.50 to 7.49 acres of land as 
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“intermediate”. Those owning from 0.50 to 2.49 acres are classified as “small”, and those 
owning less than 0.49 acres are classified as “marginalized”. In this paper we use the term 
marginalized to refer to both the small and marginalized groups as defined by BBS since, 
as we explain below, a family with less than 0.5 acres of land cannot meet even their 
most basic needs in the absence of a secure and affordable supply of water and access to 
the common property resources that were formerly an integral part of their livelihoods. 
The marginalized group has a combined population of 274,141 people or 93  % of the 
total farm population of Kushtia District (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2005).
The Chapra fieldwork data we describe here was gathered by Hossen during the 
course of his doctoral research in 2011 and 2012 (Hossen 2014). He gathered qualitative 
Fig. 2 The GK project area. Source: adapted from Banglapedia (2012)
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and quantitative data regarding the connection between river water, agricultural prac-
tices and community livelihoods. Information was first gathered through focus group 
discussions (FGDs) that included individuals from 44 Chapra households, seven from 
the wealthiest households, nine from middle or intermediate households, and 28 from 
marginalized households (12 from smallholders and 16 from day-labourer households). 
Individuals from each group sat down separately with Hossen and his research assis-
tants and discussed their local water concerns and opportunities. Based on the advice of 
FGD participants, Hossen then selected four households, one each from the upper, mid-
dle, lower, and day-labour categories, for more in-depth case studies. The case studies 
also provided Hossen with the opportunity for participant-observation. Finally based on 
the FGDs and case study information, he collected survey data from a stratified random 
sample of 259 respondents, among them 34 women respondents; 204 respondents were 
from marginalized households.
The Gorai River is a branch of the Ganges that has it origins in Kushtia District and 
provides ecological services like fresh water to the southwest hydrological region of 
Bangladesh over a distance of 199 km with a catchment area of 15,160 km2. Chapra vil-
lagers are entirely dependent on the Gorai and Ganges Basin waters for their livelihoods, 
which in turn depend entirely on agricultural production. This basin flow provides eco-
logical support to local water bodies like the Chapaigachi Haor (oxbow lake), Chapra 
and Lahineepara beels (wetlands), Lahineepara and Shaota khals (canals) at Chapra. 
These water bodies are connected with local croplands and are helpful for producing 
crops, catching fish, sailing boats, visiting relatives, organizing water sports, and pro-
viding resources for celebration. Irrespective of their socioeconomic conditions, every-
body has an equal right to use the basin flow and local, naturally produced ecological 
resources without any discrimination. They hold a detailed understanding of the dynam-
ics of winter, summer, and rainy seasons and have adapted to these seasonal patterns 
by practicing three distinct cropping patterns known locally, in the Bangla language, as 
kharif-1, kharif-2, and robi.
The kharif-1 cropping pattern occurs during the period from March to May during 
the mid-spring to mid-summer seasons. The kharif-2 period occurs from June to Octo-
ber during the mid-summer, rainy or monsoon, and autumn seasons. The robi crop-
ping season is the dry period from November to February in late autumn, winter, and 
early spring. They have developed and refined their crop schedule knowledge over sev-
eral generations, creating a deep bond between themselves, the river water and land. As 
we illustrate in the paragraphs that follow, their practices include subtle and ingenious 
adaptations to local soil conditions but also include detailed knowledge of and a deep 
reliance on wild foods and other types of ecological resources historically managed and 
accessed as local commons.
The Gorai River is also a major source of fertilizer for Chapra farmers. The borsha or 
wet season brings siltation and algae to croplands and washes away exhausted topsoil. 
It also supports the growth of water hyacinth in local water bodies, which can be used 
as compost. Farmers also collect domestic animal dung and decompose it in a pit at his 
homestead. A long worm, locally called kecho, is also most active in the beginning of 
the borsha season, burrowing into croplands and improving cropland fertility. Farmers 
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have also developed practices that allow them to maximize the benefits of seasonal kecho 
activity.
Chapra farming households also utilize river-dependent ecosystem resources to raise 
cattle, hens, chickens, ducks, goats and sheep. Ducks are taken to a local wetland to for-
age; local plants are collected as feed for cattle; water hyacinths, banana plants and bam-
boo leaves are used as fodder for bullocks and goats. With access to these resources, 
farming households can then have continual access to eggs and meat from chickens and 
ducks that are able to reproduce and maintain their population indefinitely. Bullocks fed 
with wild plant resources provide fertilizer and fuel from dung as well as their labour; 
cows provide milk every day and produce calves every year. Excess domestic animals, 
eggs or milk can be sold for cash.
Farming families also gather wild vegetables for personal consumption. Water lilies, 
marsh herbs, water spinach, hyacinth beans and ferns are available at local wetlands. 
Poorer families are especially reliant on these foods during times of food shortage. Wild 
bananas are also readily available close to their homesteads, in forested areas and along 
the Gorai River banks. Poorer households are also able to gather fruit, midribs and inflo-
rescences from wild, roadside banana plants and they also gather and eat the leaves and 
roots of arum plants.
The borsha season also provides more than sufficient fisheries in local lakes, ponds and 
wetlands. When large fish, like carp, are caught, they will often be shared with relatives 
and neighbours. The more affluent farmers will often create artificial ponds or modify 
existing ponds to create fish habitat. Water hyacinths grown at a pond’s edge, for exam-
ple, will provide suitable habitat for catfish and snakehead fish while water lilies in the 
same pond will support carp populations.
Under normal conditions, seasonal water flows also provide employment for special-
ized occupational groups like boatmen, fishermen, blacksmiths, potters, thatchers and 
basket makers. The boatmen transport agricultural goods and services during the wet 
season, fishermen sell fish in local markets, potters, thatchers and basket-makers are 
able to find sufficient materials to make products for commercial sale. As with agricul-
tural production techniques, these forms of local occupational knowledge are transmit-
ted from one generation through oral traditions.
Over the past several decades, large-scale, government-sponsored interventions in 
local water systems have, unfortunately, interrupted these livelihood patterns and are 
increasingly disabling the transmission of essential knowledge to the younger genera-
tion. This disabling of traditional livelihood patterns would be acceptable if sufficient 
employment at reasonable wages were being generated as an outcome of government 
initiatives but, as we will demonstrate in the following section, this has not been the 
case. Instead the interventions have benefitted mainly a small group of wealthy farm-
ers (0.52 % of the population) and some of the middle-class landholding group (6.5 % 
of the population), while those with no land or very small landholdings (93  % of the 
population) find themselves increasingly marginalized. Consequently, many residents of 
Chapra are experiencing major violations of their human rights as defined by the United 
Nations, rights to water, food, employment, health care, education, and housing (Hossen 
2014). These human rights violations do not just affect individuals alive today; they are 
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inter-generational in impact as when families are displaced permanently from ancestral 
homes with no chance of recovering them.
The cumulative impact of top–down government interventions
Three government interventions in the Ganges Dependent Area and the Gorai River 
Basin are mainly responsible for the human rights violations noted above, as a conse-
quence of their cumulative impact on the flow of water over the past several decades. 
In this section we will describe and evaluate the impacts first, of the Farakka Barrage, 
built in 1975 by the government of India on the Ganges River, a short distance upstream 
from the border with Bangladesh. India built this water diversion without agreement 
from Bangladesh and its history provides an effective illustration of South Asian hydro-
politics. We then examine the impacts of the Ganges-Kobodak Project, completed in the 
1980s, and the on-going Gorai River Restoration Project, both engineered by the govern-
ment of Bangladesh with strong involvement by outsider donor organizations including 
the World Bank. Both illustrate the negative impacts of an extremely centralized gov-
ernment that constructs its relationship with rural populations on the basis of political 
patronage and neoliberal economic policies. The negative impacts include an increase 
of inequality between rich and poor, an overall worsening of the livelihood situation for 
the majority of farming households, and environmental degradation of the Ganges and 
Gorai River Basins in Bangladesh.
The Farakka Barrage
The government of India built the Farakka Barrage unilaterally in 1975 about 17  km 
upstream of the Bangladesh border. The main purpose of the diversion was to divert 
water into the Hooghly River in order to limit siltation problems in the port of Calcutta. 
The dam is also used to generate a small amount of hydro-electricity and some canal 
water is used for irrigation purposes before it reaches Calcutta. This diversion, of course, 
reduces the volume of flow into Bangladesh, particularly during the dry season when it 
is most needed.
Planning of the Farakka Barrage began when Bangladesh was still part of Pakistan and 
the Pakistani government of that period was unable to resolve the dispute that erupted 
because of India’s non-cooperation (Khalid 2010). Once Bangladesh became an inde-
pendent country in 1971, a new era of conflicts began but, given the intransigent posi-
tion of India, the newly independent Bangladesh did not have the power to prevent 
the dam’s construction. After failing to resolve the dispute, Sheikh Mujib, President of 
Bangladesh, agreed to operation of the barrage for a forty-day trial period in 1975 (Swain 
1996: 1991). After this trial period, India continued to operate the facility without Bang-
ladeshi approval (Nakayama 1997: 377). On an annual basis, the Ganges River flow to 
Bangladesh lessened by 70 % and it has never returned to previous levels (Bangladesh 
Water Development Board 2012).
The governments of India and Bangladesh have since attempted to regulate the diver-
sion through the signing of two memorandums of understanding and two treaties. 
According to the most recent treaty, the 1996 Ganges Treaty signed for a thirty-year 
period, India guarantees a minimum flow of water to Bangladesh during the khora, or 
dry season, from 1 January to 31 May. The treaty has not had a positive impact on dry 
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season flows, however (Verghese 2006: 14; Hossen 2014: 64–71). For example, the aver-
age basin flow at the border, at Hardinge Bridge Station, was 2360 cusecs during the 
summer season in 1970, before construction of the dam, but that shrank to 927 cusecs in 
1980. This flow shrank still further to 828, 766, and 743 cusecs in 1990, 2000, and 2010 
respectively (BWDB 2012; Hossen 2014: 66–68). Because of this Ganges flow reduction, 
the Gorai River flow is also reduced significantly. In 1973, the Gorai River flow was 190 
cusecs but it was only 2 cusecs in 2003 (Islam and Ganuack 2011: 6). The reduced Gan-
ges River flow is estimated to cause US$ 600 million annual loss to the agricultural sec-
tor alone in Bangladesh (Khan 1996: 19).
Due to this flow reduction, the basin communities at Chapra fail to get regular bor-
sha or rainy season flows and frequently encounter bonna or severe flooding during the 
wet season when India has reason to avoid diversions into the Hooghly. Climate change 
and other changes to the Ganges Basin throughout its length in India contribute to the 
severity and unpredictability of extreme flood events. Chapra and other GDA communi-
ties in Bangladesh are also more likely now to encounter khora or drought during the 
summer season, which is responsible for damage and loss of agricultural crops, house-
hold assets, and employment opportunities. The loss of water also reduces flows to local 
lakes and wetlands and thus reduces the supply of common property resources essential 
to the livelihoods of the majority of farming households.
The Ganges‑Kobodak project
The Ganges-Kobodak (GK) project is a state owned and directed water modernization 
project. Project planning began in 1955, well before construction of the Farakka Bar-
rage, by the East Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority. It was part of a 
master plan designed to manage flood control, drainage and irrigation issues simultane-
ously (Chowdhury 2009: 3; Thompson and Sultana 1996: 1). The irrigation component 
of the GK Project involved the construction of a series of canals that divert water from 
the Ganges River at a point several kilometers upstream from where the Gorai River 
branches off from the Ganges. It was under construction at the same time as the Farakka 
Barrage but not completed until 1983, several years after the barrage began operation 
and, as a result, planners were forced to accommodate the changes brought about by the 
Farakka diversion. During the 1970s its design was also modified to be consistent with 
the United Nations’ Flood Control, Drainage and Irrigation Program (Alexander et al. 
1998; Talukder and Shamsuddin 2012) and in support of the goals of the Green Revolu-
tion (Cleaver 1972: 177; Herring 2001: 235).
The project encompasses an area bounded on the north and east by the Gorai and 
Madhumati Rivers, on the south by the Nabaganga River and on the west side by the 
Mathabhanga River. It covers thirteen upazilas of the four districts of Kushtia, Chua-
danga, Jhenaidah, and Magura with a total coverage area of 1655 km and 488,032 acres 
of cropland. The total population of the GK project area is 2.5 million, 0.15 million of 
whom own agricultural lands (Fig. 2).
The project was not able to compensate for the loss of water due to the Farakka Bar-
rage but because of the decreasing flow of water in the Ganges and Gorai Rivers, the GK 
canals have become the main source of irrigation water for agricultural production in 
Chapra and throughout the GDA. Thus, rather than supplying a secure, supplementary 
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source of water, it has led to increased farmer reliance on a government-operated water 
system subject to capture by elite interests. The project has not met even its minimum 
objectives in respect to irrigation water but, to make matters worse, it has seriously dis-
rupted the natural flow of water to lakes, ponds and wetlands in the Chapra region. It 
has also caused a significant number of displacements of people and changed local set-
tlement patterns due to the placement of canals, buildings, and roads. The project failed 
to provide reliable a water supply, in part, because it failed to take account of local agro-
ecological systems, seasonal practices and cropping patterns. Performance has also been 
reduced by the more frequent occurrence over recent decades of floods, drought, water 
stagnation, riverbank erosion and embankment failure due to Ganges flow irregularities. 
The project thus displaced relatively egalitarian water practices with ones controlled by 
local elites operating under systems of political patronage. Moreover, the project trans-
formed self-sufficient local agricultural and employment practices into a system of mar-
ket relations in which 93 % of the population are unable to achieve basic human rights 
(Hossen 2014).
The Gorai River restoration project
The combined effect of the Farakka Barrage and the GK Project has been to dramatically 
reduce water flow in the Gorai River and this has resulted in major sedimentation prob-
lems. The Gorai River restoration project (GRRP) was implemented in an attempt to 
restore river flow through dredging operations but like the GK project it has only wors-
ened the situation for the majority of farming families. The Bangladesh Water Develop-
ment Board (BWDB) implemented the project in 1998 with the assistance of the World 
Bank. Sedimentation is deposited along the shores of the river but also as islands in the 
middle of the river channel. These forms of sedimentation, known as charlands (Chowd-
hury 1984; Lahiri-Dutt and Samanta 2013), further reduce river flow and cause ecologi-
cal service failures. Ninety-one percent of the households Hossen surveyed at Chapra 
in 2011 reported major challenges for practicing traditional agricultural activities due 
to failures of water supply and ecological services from the Gorai River and local water 
bodies. These water bodies include Chapaigachi oxbow lakes, Shinda and Shaota canals 
and the Lahineepara and Chapra wetlands, which were normally replenished each year 
by the Gorai River during the borsha season but sedimentation and erosion patterns 
now interfere with this process.
The GRRP is a major example of corporate as well as governmental control over local 
water resource management in Bangladesh. It was implemented as part of the World 
Bank’s Flood Action Plan (Boyce 1990; Paul 1995; Thompson and Sultana 1996) and 
Integrated Water Resource Management program in Bangladesh (Ahmad and Ahmed 
2003; Brammer 1990; Center for Environmental and Geographic Services (CEGIS) 2003; 
Gupta et  al. 2005). Phase one began in 1998 and continued until 2009. The dredging 
started at the point where the Gorai River branches off from the Ganges and continued 
20 km downstream, including the portion of the river that flows past Chapra (de Groot 
and Pieter 2001). Four foreign companies carried out this dredging at a total cost of 
$160 million (Khan 2012). Costs were covered by several external donors, including the 
Dutch government and the World Bank (Ministry of Water Resources 2001; World Bank 
1998). Phase two of the project began in 2010 and continued to 2013 with a target area 
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of 36 km from Kushtia city to Kumarkhali Sub-district. Phase two overlapped somewhat 
with phase one since new sedimentation and charland emerged in some phase one areas 
after only few months.
The GRRP is a perfect example of the ways in which the political culture of Bangla-
desh and its top-down political processes tend to undermine local water management 
systems and promote corporate and elite control over local natural resources. The pro-
ject was designed and implemented by the World Bank and the national government 
and, even when local government was involved, it was dominated by local elites. Local 
governments; were responsible, for instance, to renovate local water bodies and con-
nect them with the dredged area. Local governments were also responsible for ensur-
ing proper working conditions and ensuring the security of dredging machines and staff. 
Many of the staff were foreigners and knew nothing about local culture and tradition. 
They needed a secure environment, food and lodging arrangements from local govern-
ments and, in order to service these needs, the dredging company works closely with 
local government leaders but not with the communities those leaders are supposed to 
represent. Local political leaders are thus able to direct the project in ways that favor 
their interests but do not necessarily serve the interests of other community members.
The GRRP illustrates a major gap between the government water management sys-
tems and local community needs and desires. According to the stated goals of the GRRP, 
the central government wants to develop flood control and facilitate drainage during the 
rainy season and secure enough water during the summer that freshwater can flow to 
more southern points in the GDA including Khulna city, Mongla port and the Sunda-
rbans. On the other hand, the focus group participants at Chapra explained to Hossen 
(2014: 85–86) that they want natural resources back, like siltation, algae, earth-worms 
and water hyacinth, to promote cropland fertility. They also want to get back water-
borne wild vegetables like marsh herb, water lily, ferns and hyacinth bean and natural 
fisheries like carp, barb and minnow. They want to be able to make agricultural materials 
like ploughshares, frames, ladders and sticks from natural resources like bamboo, cane 
and wood, which are now in short supply.
Since the top–down approaches of both Indian and Bangladeshi governments are the 
source of many, if not most, of the current water governance problems in the region, 
solutions will need to come from the bottom-up and must take into account the inter-
ests of both nations, all classes and interest groups. However, the hydro-politics of South 
Asia as a whole severely limit opportunities for governance innovation and for that rea-
son, in the next section, we provide a brief outline of regional hydro-politics. We then 
conclude with a set of proposals for governance system reform.
Hydro‑politics of the Ganges–Brahmaputra Basin
Every country in the GBB wants to use its water resources to promote development. 
However, the complexity of upstream and downstream geographic positions and asym-
metric economic–military power relations have made it difficult for them to work 
cooperatively to achieve their goals. India is able to maintain a position of hegemony 
in the region because its geographic, economic, and military supremacy by comparison 
to weaker Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. In order to exploit its position of strength, 
India follows a bilateral approach and refuses to participate in basin-wide negotiations 
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or management agreements. It also refuses any third party involvement in the Ganges 
Basin management (Hagerty 1991: 351). Only China is in a position to challenge India’s 
hegemony.
India’s bilateral approach has allowed it to make contradictory arguments about the 
rights of upstream versus downstream countries. For example, when the Government 
of China announced on 8 November 2010 that it would build a hydropower project at 
Zangmu on the Tsangpo River, an upstream tributary of Brahmaputra in Tibet, India 
invoked international water laws and conventions to argue that China, Nepal and Bhu-
tan, as upstream countries did not have the right to build any water project that could 
harm their interests as the downstream country (The Hindu 2010). However, India does 
not respect those same laws in respect to Bangladesh, where it is the upstream coun-
try. When necessary, India uses military forces to ensure its regional supremacy (Kapur 
1988: 698; T.J. 2013).
India’s domination of Nepal is evident in the Kosi-Gandak and Mahakhali water shar-
ing agreements. The Kosi River agreement signed in 1954 was renewed in 1966 for a 
199-year period without accommodating the grievances of Nepal (Iyer 2008: 10). The 
agreement allows India to establish infrastructure that is helpful for more land use and 
agricultural development in India. However, this infrastructure inundates additional land 
in Nepal and causes land and agricultural losses. In 1927, the Mahakhali River sharing 
agreement (Chakraborty and Serageldin 2004: 204) allowed the construction of a dam at 
Tanalkpur on the Mahakali River at the India Nepal border. The treaty was renewed in 
1996 but without resolving bitter and protracted grievances from Nepal about their level 
of access to irrigation water (Bandyopadhyay 1995: 433; Chakraborty and Serageldin 
2004: 204; Elhance 1999: 181). As a weaker and landlocked country, Nepal is particularly 
vulnerable to pressure from India to concede to its demands.
Bhutan, like Nepal, is also a much weaker, landlocked country with major hydropower 
potential. Bhutan has agreed to numerous hydropower projects that mainly serve India’s 
interests: Jaldhaka (1961), Chukka (1976), Sankosh (1993), Kurichu (1996), Tala (1996), 
Punatsangcu I (2007), and Punatsangcu II and Mangdechu (2005) (Bandyopadhyay 1995: 
431). (Rahaman and Varis 2009: 69). The analyses of Bandyopadhyay (1995), and Elhance 
(1999). Verghese and Iyer (1993) demonstrate India’s dependence on Bhutan for water 
and power resources and willingness to maintain their hydro-political domination by 
whatever means are necessary.
India also insists on a bilateral approach with Bangladesh and on this basis the two 
countries established the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission (JRC) in 1972, 
excluding the other GBB countries (Brichieri-Colombi and Bradnock 2003: 50). The JRC 
has authority to adjudicate problems arising from the operation of Farakka Barrage but, 
as noted previously, Bangladeshi grievances remain unresolved. This bilateral institution 
does not recognize or apply standard international water laws and conventions such the 
1996 Helsinki Rules, the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, and the 2004 Berlin Rules.
Even more worrisome is the fact that India is moving unilaterally to implement 
its National River Linking Project (NRLP), which will radically transform water flows 
throughout the GBB. The plan calls for the construction of two major canals that will 
divert water from the Brahmaputra Basin, upstream from Bangladesh, to the Ganges 
Basin in India. The first canal project will connect Jogighopa Barrage in Assam to the 
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Farakka Barrage via the Teesta River in the Indian State of West Bengal. The second 
canal will carry Brahmaputra water from Nepal and Bhutan to the Ganges (Rahaman 
and Varies 2009: 65). The intention is to divert 173 billion cubic meters water to sev-
eral states in India that are subject to water shortages: Uttar Pradesh, Madhaya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Gujrat, Orissa, Andra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu 
(Ahmad and Ahmed 2003: 321–2).
Meanwhile, the government of China has its own major plans for the Brahmaputra 
Basin upstream from both Bangladesh and India. The government seeks to divert irriga-
tion water from the Tsangpo to the Gobi desert (Horgan 1996). The Tsangpo Canyon is 
the deepest and longest canyon in the world with a 68,800 megawatt hydropower poten-
tial (Rahaman and Varis 2009: 70). Another national Chinese project, the Greater West-
ern Route Water Diversion Project (GWRWDP), itself just one project within South to 
North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP) will also link with the Tsangpo River project 
(Rahaman and Varis 2009: 70). Chinese and Indian projects thus compete with one 
another and collectively threaten less powerful countries and regions with unparalleled 
environmental crises (Bandyopadhyay and Ghosh 2009; D’Souza 2006: 248).
Water governance reform through community inclusion
The top–down governance approach that dominates South Asian hydro-politics today is 
deeply rooted in the British colonial era (D’Souza 2006; Gilmartin 2015; Mulvany 2014) 
but is perhaps best understood as a localized expression of what Escobar (1996: 328) has 
termed “global ecocracy”. Environmental management discourse in all basin countries 
is now framed in terms of “sustainable development” but the system is dominated by 
a huge managerial and technological apparatus (Swayamprakash 2014) that is devoted 
to extracting the maximum economic value from all basin resources including water. 
We have seen, however, in the case of Chapra, that the benefits of such a system are 
restricted to the elite while heavy costs are inflicted on the poor and on the environment 
itself. In this paper we propose instead an “ecocentric” approach to governance (Albert 
2000: 27; Brunnee and Stephen 1997:41) that treats the water basin as a socio-ecologi-
cal system (Berkes et al. 2000; Smith 2008; Wagner 2013) and incorporates measures to 
protect the property rights and human rights of basin residents. Governance should be 
democratic and multilateral, including all countries of the GBB (Bandyopadhyaya and 
Ghosh 2009: 50; Brunee and Toope 1997; Crow and Singh 2000; Faisal 2002: 322) and 
should focus on reducing vulnerability to ecosystem service failures. Following Folke 
et al. (2005), we note that sustainable ecological governance must be based on coordina-
tion among individuals, organizations, agencies, and institutions at the multiple scales. 
Our approach is consistent with the basic principles of Integrated Water Resource Man-
agement (IWRM) but, in agreement with Orlove and Caton (2010: 410), we emphasize 
the fact that IWRM does not provide guidance for how to realize those principles in 
the face of entrenched and systemic political oppositions. We also recognize that IWRM 
discourse can readily be captured within the discourse of global ecocracy, as has been 
the case in Bangladesh where pressures from the United Nations, the World Bank and 
other donor agencies have led to the insertion of IWRM discourse into state planning 
documents, but without implementation of those principles on the ground.
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In developing our proposals for water governance reform we recognize the fact that 
concerted grassroots political action will be necessary to bring them into being and that 
such action could be thwarted indefinitely by intransigent national governments. How-
ever, we also believe that the meaningful change towards ecocentric governance cannot 
occur without precisely these kinds of reforms. We thus seek to offer practical politi-
cal advice as well contribute to theoretical debates about governance. The reforms we 
envisage include the creation of “local parliaments of water” as they have been described 
by Latour (1998), not through central government mandate, as was the case in France, 
but through the coordination of village-level initiatives that rely on local knowledge, the 
defence of human rights, and application of international law in respect to water.
Our analysis indicates that reform is needed at all levels of the governance system in 
the GBB: international, national, regional and local. Given our emphasis on the need for 
grassroots initiatives, we begin with recommendations for local level reform and then 
move upwards through the system to conclude with a recommendation for a new inter-
national, watershed-wide institution that would be populated, at least in part, by village 
level representatives.
Local level governance
Water management institutions in Bangladesh exist at national, district, sub-district 
(upazila), and union levels but not at the two lowest levels of political organization, the 
ward and village. Villages can be as small as a few hundred people or as large as a few 
thousand. Wards are typically made up of two to four villages. Union and Upazila coun-
cils tend to be controlled by local elites since their resources allow them to build the 
patronage systems necessary to get elected. We propose the creation of an elected ward-
level institution with each village in the ward electing its own representatives. This sys-
tem would not automatically eliminate domination by elite interests but it would favor 
the election of more non-elite representatives. Elite domination could also be limited 
by forbidding political party members from running and prohibiting the involvement of 
national or regional political parties in elections.
Gender parity could be achieved by having one woman elected from each village on 
the basis of votes cast by women only, and some elected positions could be reserved for 
representatives of the economically marginalized households that constitute 93 % of the 
farming population at Chapra.
Election Councils should be established in each village to oversee elections. Election 
Council members and a Council Chief should be elected but would serve voluntarily. In this 
case also, political party members should be prohibited from running. The Election Council 
would be responsible to ensure that no Ward candidates received financial support from 
political parties or members of the local elite. Elections for the Ward level water governance 
institution should be held every 3–5 years depending on community preferences.
The elected village representatives on Ward Council should have office space and spe-
cific duties and responsibilities regarding local water governance. They should consult 
with villagers every week concerning local water concerns and issues and should bring 
those concerns forward to the Ward Council. The representatives’ duties and respon-
sibilities should be considered as full time jobs with an appropriate level of salary and 
benefits.
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In order to ensure that the wishes of local institutions are not simply over-ruled by 
institutions at higher levels, ward-level institutions should have veto power in key 
domains of water governance such as infrastructure construction and water pricing. 
Higher levels of government would therefore have to consult with ward level institutions 
and take account of the knowledge and needs of the communities they represent.
National government agreement and legislation would be needed in order to pro-
vide local level institutions with veto power and properly integrate them with existing 
management institutions at higher levels. The granting of veto power is unlikely in the 
current political climate but local level institutions could be created as advisory bodies 
to begin with, and acquire formal authority later on. This type of grassroots movement 
may seem unlikely to many readers but citizens’ movements of many kinds already exist 
throughout Bangladesh. Rather than engage in an argument here about the feasibility of 
this type of grassroots action under present circumstances, we simply wish to point out 
that meaningful change towards ecocentric and democratic governance will not occur in 
the absence of effective grassroots movements.
National and mid‑level governance institutions
In addition to creating new institutions at the village and ward level, government insti-
tutions at union, upazila, district and national levels need to be reformed through a 
program of decentralization and democratization. Under the current system, some 
members of mid-level government councils are elected while others are appointed by 
the government. Since the elected positions are controlled by wealthy landowners and 
the appointed positions are given to government party supporters, these councils act 
mainly as agents of the national government not as democratic and representative forms 
of regional government. We recommend that the appointments now being made by the 
central government should be replaced with appointments made by each ward. Every 
Union Council has twelve wards and each ward could select two of their elected mem-
bers to serve on the Union Council together with members-at-large elected from within 
the union boundaries. A similar approach could be applied at the upazila, district and 
national levels, so that local interests and local knowledge could percolate upwards in 
the system and counterbalance the controlling power of the central government.
Basin‑wide water governance institution
Currently there are no over-arching formal agreements for water sharing and joint man-
agement of the Ganges-Brahamputra Basin. As described previously, there is a patch-
work of bilateral agreements and a history of unilateralism by India and China. Both 
India and China are now trying to implement continental-scale river diversion schemes 
that will inevitably bring them into sharp conflict with one another as well as other basin 
nations in the upper Brahmaputra watershed in particular. There is an urgent need, 
therefore, to negotiate a multilateral agreement based on sound and consistent inter-
national water law and to establish a multilateral institution to oversee the terms of the 
agreement. A multilateral institution with legal decision-making authority could help 
restore some balance to the asymmetric power relations in the region (Bandyopadhyay 
and Ghosh 2009).
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IWRM principles can also serve as the foundation for a multilateral approach. They 
are consistent with an understanding of water as a total social fact (Orlove and Caton 
2010). They support the need for watershed-wide approaches and community inclusion. 
In order to actualize this broad vision of water governance we propose the creation of 
an elected council with equal representation from all five basin countries. Each country 
could hold four or five seats, irrespective of geographic and population size, in order to 
ensure a balance of national interests. Local community representatives at national lev-
els in China, Nepal, Bhutan, India and Bangladesh will elect their representatives with 
direct votes. These representatives would need to be elected approximately every 4 years 
to ensure democratic process and accountability to the respective communities. Every 
country would need to provide financial and technical support for this institution so that 
it can function properly. This Basin Council would not replace existing technical and 
scientific institutions such as the bilateral Joint River Commission (JRC) created by India 
and Bangladesh in 1996, but would work as a pressure group for incorporating commu-
nity voices in the deliberations of technical commissions.
Before executing any water development program, Basin Council members would 
consult with community representatives in their respective countries and the Council 
should hold a veto power that would allow it to protect the historical property rights 
and basic human rights of local communities. No water development programs would 
be implemented in the GBB without approval of the Basin Council. If a representative 
raises potential community concerns over a water program, the program needs to be 
reviewed and appropriate actions taken. This participatory approach can be a helpful 
mechanism for overcoming the existing top–down domination and local community’s 
survival challenges.
The governance institution needs autonomy from political interferences (Nishat and 
Faisal 2000). For example, the current JRC does not have the ability to perform water 
management tasks independently because of political intervention. The new institution 
should function based on its institutional guidelines so that every country’s community 
representatives can represent their voices. This institution should also include a mean-
ingful third party participation in formulating and implementation of the GBB water 
policies based on community representatives. The third party can be an international 
organization like the United Nations which can overcome the current disagreements 
between the basin countries based on institutional guidelines.
Conclusion
Literally thousands of communities and millions of people in the Ganges–Brahmaputra 
Basin are facing survival challenges similar to those described for Chapra, in Bangladesh. 
The basin countries need to find solutions for these challenges so that they can sustain 
the environments and resources on which river-bank communities depend for their live-
lihoods. Ecological resource governance with an ecocentric approach rather the current 
top-down approach can be one major solution. The basin countries can use international 
water laws as guidelines for developing water governance institutions. The Berlin Rules, 
for instance, include guidelines for protecting “ecological integrity” by “establishing 
basin wide or other joint management arrangements”.
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Institutional reform is needed to provide for community inclusion at local, national, 
and basin-wide levels. The pathway to creating institutional reform on this scale will be 
long and complicated but we believe momentum is building, in Chapra and many other 
GBB settings, for just this kind of very badly needed reform.
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